Abstract-We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context, where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-dependent prices.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I
N THE past several decades that followed the seminal work on spot market pricing [1] , the electricity industry has evolved from vertical integrated regulated monopolies to competitive supply and demand market participants with equal access to a regulated transmission and distribution network. Nevertheless, due to special features of the power industry, including a limited number of producers (electricity suppliers), large capital investments that introduce barriers to entry, and congestion caused by occasionally binding transmission constraints, the electricity market is characterized by oligopolistic conditions [2] . Under perfect competition, suppliers would bid their marginal costs, a necessary condition for social welfare and efficiency maximization. In an imperfect oligopolistic energy market setting, however, suppliers can exploit market manipulation opportunities to increase their profits by bidding above their marginal cost.
The investigation of such behavior, referred to as strategic bidding, is of dual interest. First, to market participants (mainly suppliers), who are interested in devising optimal bidding strategies that would allow them to "outsmart" competitors and realize profits exceeding those that a perfectly competitive market would allow. Second, to market regulators, who are interested in identifying market power abuses and developing policies to increase efficiency and social welfare.
There is an immense amount of literature on strategic bidding in the context of electricity markets (see [3] for a related non-exhaustive literature review) particularly when one takes into account the specific market rules that apply. Currently, U.S. markets involve multi-part bids for energy and commitment costs, as well as several types of ancillary services, resulting in location-dependent hourly and real-time (5 min) prices. In the European day-ahead market coupling problem [4] , even more complex bids are allowed. Regardless of the underlying framework and market rules, an optimal bidding strategy aims to answer the same question: how to bid in order to maximize profits.
From a game-theoretic point of view, the approaches for equilibrium analysis of the strategic bidding problem can be further classified as Bertrand models, Cournot and Stackelberg models, and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) models. In the latter approach, instead of setting their price bids (Bertrand) or quantities (Cournot), suppliers bid their supply functions that link prices with quantities. The SFE literature originates from the seminal work of Klemperer and Meyer [5] , and, since its first application in electricity markets [6] , it has been extensively studied [7] , [8] -an overview is presented in [9] , in both stylized examples and actual electricity markets (see [10] - [12] for analytical and numerical results, and [13] for an empirical analysis).
One of the main criticisms regarding game-theoretic approaches is the unrealistic assumption that the payoff functions of all participants are publicly available. Most related works deal with this issue by assuming some type of uncertainty. An early work [14] proposes a recursive dynamic programming approach for determining the optimal bid price for each block of generation, in which each supplier models the uncertainty about rival bid prices by a probability distribution. In [15] , the developed bidding scheme maximizes the hourly profit assuming all other producers' bids are represented by a multivariate normal distribution whose parameters are estimated from historical data. In [16] , each supplier assumes types (based on the cost structure) of other suppliers and their joint probability distribution, based on the published information on fuel contracts, availability of transmission lines, and operating parameters. In [17] , a decompositionbased particle swarm optimization method is proposed to solve the expected profit maximization problem with the market clearing price modeled as an uncertain, exogenous variable. In [18] , a decentralized Nash equilibrium learning strategy is presented in a Bertrand competition framework to solve the economic dispatch problem. Recently, in [19] , a Bayesian inference approach is proposed to reveal the aggregate supply curve in a day-ahead electricity market. In [20] , a noncooperative game with incomplete information among demand response aggregators is considered under different market conditions, where a Bayesian approach is used to estimate the unknown information such as the types of competitors. In [21] , a multi-period market equilibrium problem is considered to study the strategic behavior of energy storage systems, where the optimality conditions of all participants' profit maximization problems are collected and solved together.
In this paper, we consider SFE-based equilibrium strategies for suppliers in the context of a day-ahead electricity market. We address the aforementioned criticism by estimating payoff functions using an inverse optimization approach combined with the theory of variational inequalities [22] . Inverse optimization seeks to recover input data to optimization problems from optimal solutions; it was first introduced in [23] but recently revisited in new settings [22] , [24] , [25] . Interestingly, inverse optimization has not been extensively used in the context of electricity markets. In [26] , inverse optimization is used to identify the bids of marginal suppliers in a multi-period network-constrained electricity pool. In [27] , it is employed to address the market-bidding problem of a cluster of priceresponsive consumers of electricity. In [28] , it is used to determine market structure from commodity and transportation prices; the methodology is applied to data from the MISO electricity market. Recently, [29] used inverse optimization to estimate how loads respond to demand response price signals.
A preliminary conference version of this paper has appeared in [30] . That paper focused on comparisons between inverse optimization-based strategic bidding versus earlier approaches [15] . The present paper uses a different, more realistic parametrization of the unknown cost function with respect to observable market variables, has an extensive numerical validation of the proposed approach, establishes new rigorous results on algorithm termination, and offers extensions to location-dependent prices.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to leverage inverse optimization for estimating cost parameters in payoff functions and obtaining equilibrium bids in the context of electricity markets. Our method is driven purely by data, in the sense that only the observed samples are utilized for inference and estimation, without relying on any distributional assumptions on the observed data. We note that any hypothesis on the data generating pattern could be questionable, due to the lack of supporting evidence on such assumption and the noisy nature of the data. By contrast, data-driven approaches receive input from the observed samples and are self-adjusted in the estimation process as more samples are available.
The main idea of this paper is to learn from past bids of electricity suppliers that bid strategically in a day-ahead market context. We develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating suppliers' cost functions, based on historical bidding data. We propose an algorithm that randomly searches for cost function parameters with good out-of-sample performance, among multiple possible values that are compatible with past data. Our proposed framework is validated with extensive numerical experimentation, and is extended to accommodate location-dependent prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the general market framework. In Section III, we formulate the strategic bidding problem (referred to as the "forward" problem), and in Section IV we present the inverse optimization framework as it applies to our day-ahead market setting. In Section V, we discuss the specific algorithm we use to estimate competitors' cost parameters, based on which equilibrium bids are obtained, and establish its convergence properties. In Section VI we illustrate our approach with numerical examples. In Section VII, we discuss the extension of our approach to location-dependent prices. We conclude and provide directions for further research in Section VIII.
II. MARKET FRAMEWORK
We consider a day-ahead electricity market setting, which is composed of N electricity suppliers, and a market operator instantiating a Power Exchange (PX). Each supplier submits a bid curve (supply curve) that describes the relationship between energy price and production quantity, for each of the 24 hours of the next day. After receiving the bidding functions from all suppliers, the market operator clears the market by balancing aggregate supply and demand; the output is the hourly market clearing price and the supplier specific dispatch schedules. Assuming no inter-temporal coupling in the PX setting, the auctions for different hours are performed separately and independently. This allows us to consider the bidding strategy for a specific hour and omit the time index in our analysis.
In actual power markets, the bidding functions are piecewise-constant curves, reflecting the constant bid price (marginal as-bid cost) for each block of electricity generation. These piecewise-constant curves correspond to piecewiselinear functions for the total as-bid costs of the suppliers, which approximate a quadratic cost function of typical generators. Piecewise-linear functions are used in practice to allow reliance on available commercial optimization solvers (for solving large-scale security-constrained unit commitment and economic dispatch problems typically formulated as mixed integer linear programming problems). In this paper, we assume the same affine bid curve as commonly used in the SFE literature; this assumption not only facilitates our analysis, but also corresponds to a quadratic approximation of generator cost functions.
Assume that supplier i submits a linear non-decreasing bid function to the market operator, α i + β i P i , i = 1, . . . , N, that denotes the marginal as-bid cost of power at production level P i , and α i , β i are the bidding coefficients to be determined under the optimal bidding strategy. After receiving these linear bidding functions, the market operator derives the clearing price and the generator dispatch schedule as follows:
where R is the market clearing price, Q forecast is the demand forecast (or as-bid load as is also the case in actual electricity markets) that is publicly announced by the market operator,
are the minimum and maximum generation levels, respectively, of supplier i, I is the set of suppliers producing at P max i , I is the set of suppliers producing at P min i , I the set of marginal suppliers, and Q the effective demand met by marginal suppliers.
Since for i ∈ I the capacity constraints are not binding, for a given Q forecast (hence, Q) the solution to (1) becomes
where we write R(α, β; Q), P i (α, β; Q) to explicitly express the dependency on α (α 1 , . . . , α N ) and β (β 1 , . . . , β N ) for a given demand forecast resulting in effective demand Q.
III. FORWARD PROBLEM FORMULATION
The forward problem deals with the individual profit maximization problem, in which supplier i determines her bidding curve (α i , β i ) to maximize her profit φ i (α, β; Q) defined as
where C i (P i (α, β; Q)) is the production cost at generation level P i (α, β; Q). The problem is formulated as follows:
whereᾱ is an upper bound on α i , and is related to the price cap in electricity markets. 1 Note that the form of the profit function is generic (defined as revenues minus costs) and, in general, each supplier can have her own cost function. For the case of electricity generators, a common assumption is a quadratic cost function:
which implies a marginal cost equal to c i1 + 2c i2 P i . Since the intercept of the quadratic cost function (parameter c i0 ) is constant (this practically refers to the so-called "no-load" cost of a generator), its value will not affect the profit maximization problem of the supplier and, without loss of generality, it can be set to zero. A direct comparison of the marginal cost (c i1 + 2c i2 P i ) and the linear bid function (α i +β i P i ) indicates that the cost parameters c i1 and 2c i2 correspond to the bidding curve parameters α i and β i , respectively. Hence, truthful bidding would result in α i = c i1 and
In this paper, we assume that suppliers game only with parameter α i , and that β i is small and equal to 2c i2 , representing a publicly known, technology-specific efficiency decline associated with approaching generating capacity. This assumption corresponds to the "bid-α" game in [31] , implying that β i is known to other suppliers for all intents and purposes. We elaborate on this assumption next.
The technology and capacity of individual generating plants is public information that provides useful partial information about their cost functions. Nevertheless, their fuel and variable maintenance cost, and their exact heat rate (efficiency), reflected primarily in parameter c i1 , is proprietary and not known with sufficient accuracy to competitors so as to allow them to bid optimally. On the other hand, as also pointed out in [32] , the marginal cost functions of individual suppliers usually have very shallow slopes, and thus β i is relatively small (about two orders of magnitude lower than α i ); furthermore, if both α i and β i can be chosen, the existence of a unique equilibrium is rare. Hence, one can argue that the small value of the slope of the marginal cost (2c i2 ) is more or less known, and that the suppliers reflect this cost in parameter β i , 2 as in [32] , thus avoiding bidding non credible high slopes. Still, in our results section, we mainly explore cases in which we allow errors in the estimates of past bids or the knowledge of parameters (including parameter β i ). Furthermore, we note that if we consider the framework from the perspective of a regulator, the technology-specific data (e.g., heat-rate curves) that mainly drive the slope of the marginal cost are declared by the participants; as such, the slope is relatively easily calculated. 1 Strictly speaking, the price cap imposes a bound on the marginal cost at the maximum capacity, α i + β i P max i ≤ᾱ, implying that the upper bound is different for each supplier i, i.e.,ᾱ i =ᾱ − β i P max i . However, in practice, the price cap is high enough, and we can assume without loss of generality a common upper bound on α i . 2 The parameter β i reflects (i) the smoothing/regularization of the bid conforming to the monotonically increasing market rule requirement (marginal costs are physically not strictly monotonic), and (ii) the advantage of and desire for achieving unique price-directed marginal generator schedules. In the experiments, the values of β i are on the order of 0.1.
For the purposes of this paper, we assume that c i1 consists of two cost components: (i) one non-fuel cost component that reflects operational and maintenance variable costs (e.g., labor, parts, consumables, lubricants, chemicals, consumption from power station supplies, etc.), and (ii) a fuel-cost component (essentially depending on the heat rate and the fuel price). As such, c i1 is defined as
where ξ is a variable reflecting the publicly known fuel price, and θ i1 , θ i2 are the unknown cost coefficients. This decomposition is in line with the declared characteristics of the generation units, which comprise the heat rate curve and operational (other than fuel) and maintenance variable costs. We note that the framework can support even more detailed decompositions (e.g., consider separately a carbon price for emissions). Also, we note that the unknown cost coefficients can be interpreted in various ways. For instance, assuming a publicly known fuel price ξ , coefficient θ i2 may contain the combined effect of the heat rate curve and potential discounts that suppliers may have secured; such contract information is not available to either regulators or competitors. Following the above assumptions, i.e., setting c i0 = 0 and c i2 = (1/2)β i in the quadratic cost function (4), and using (5), the profit function for supplier i can be rewritten as
Note that for a given Q and ξ , the profit of supplier i is determined by the actions α of all players and her own cost parameter θ i (θ i1 , θ i2 ). We therefore write φ i (θ i ; α, Q, ξ) to emphasize this dependency (β is removed since it is constant and known).
Since all suppliers choose their bids by solving the profit maximization problem (3), we can construct a SFE model describing the game among all profit-maximizing suppliers. By definition, a specific α is a Nash equilibrium if no single supplier can increase her profit by unilaterally changing her own bid. We know (see [30] ) that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium α * = (α * 1 , . . . , α * N ) in this SFE model, since φ i (θ i ; α, Q, ξ) is strictly concave in α i , i.e., its second partial derivative is strictly negative.
Next, we compute both the first and the second partial derivatives of the profit function with respect to α i . From (6), the first derivative is
where 0
We observe that the first derivative is linear in α i and also linear in θ i1 and θ i2 . From (7), the second derivative is
From (8), it is easy to verify that ∇ 2 ii φ i (θ i ; α, Q, ξ) < 0, which implies strict concavity since β i > 0 and 0 <β i < 1.
IV. INVERSE PROBLEM FORMULATION
The inverse problem seeks to estimate rivals' cost parameters. This knowledge is required for estimating the objective of the profit maximization problem (3). The main theoretical foundation is attributed to [22] , where the authors estimate the utility functions of the players in a Nash game from the observed equilibrium.
In the context of this paper, we are given (or we can obtain/estimate) M past equilibrium bids (observations) α j = (α j i ; i ∈ I j ), j = 1, . . . , M, where I j is the set of marginal suppliers for observation j and is defined similar to I in (2). The α j are realized under different residual demand levels Q j and fuel prices ξ j , and we are interested in estimating θ i of supplier i = 1, . . . , N. Without loss of generality, we assume that for each supplier i there are sufficient observations j at which supplier i was marginal (i.e., i ∈ I j ), so that there is enough information to estimate θ i . In case this is not true for some suppliers, we can a priori remove them from the set {1, . . . , N} (and appropriately adjust (1)). For such suppliers, we simply do not have enough information to estimate their cost parameters. It should be noted, however, that these suppliers will generally correspond to base loaded units that do not compete in the market. Given the quadratic cost function representation, the resulting linear supply curve is associated with a broadly construed notion of marginality that will render non-base-loaded units marginal during some hours. As long as each unit is marginal in some of the observations -not all units need to be marginal in all observations-the proposed framework is broadly applicable, and there is no loss of generality from the exclusion of base loaded units.
The estimates for the cost parameters are obtained by applying [22, Th. 3] , which is derived through duality, and leads to the following optimization problem:
where y = (y
is the infinity norm, and the last constraint is used for normalization purposes and will be discussed below. We note that the variables in ∇ i φ i are θ i , and that ∇ i φ i is linear in θ i , where α j , Q j , and ξ j are parameters of the optimization problem. From (7), we have
Interestingly, we can reformulate the optimization problem (9) as a Linear Programming (LP) problem, which can be solved very efficiently. Specifically, instead of the infinite norm objective, we can introduce constraints that impose an upper bound to each | j | and then minimize this upper bound.
The last constraint in (9) is a normalization constraint, which is equivalent to [22, Eqs. (39d) and (39e)]. The right hand side (rhs) of the constraint, φ i norm , is some estimate of the partial derivative at a specific point, which is evaluated at an observation k i (potentially different for each i). In [22] , for illustration purposes, the rhs estimate is obtained using the actual values of θ i at a median observation, considering some lower bounds for the bidding coefficients. We further elaborate on the implementation of this constraint in Section V.
We note that this inverse optimization technique still applies even when more constraints are imposed in the forward problem setup or when the bid function is changed, as long as R and P i have closed-form expressions w.r.t. the bidding coefficients.
The quality of the computed equilibrium strategies depends on the explanatory value of the estimated cost parameters. Indeed, good estimators should explain future equilibria as well as the equilibria used to estimate them. The following result, which is a restatement of [22, Th. 6] , ensures the quality of the estimated cost functions under mild conditions. To simplify the notation, we assume that all suppliers are marginal at all past observations j; otherwise, proper adjustments to the statement of the theorem can be made.
Theorem 1: Suppose that α j , j = 1, . . . , M are i.i.d. realizations of a random variableα, andα ∈ {α : 0 ≤ α i ≤ᾱ, ∀ i} almost surely. Then, for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability at least 1 − η w.r.t. the sampling, P(α is a z-approximate equilibrium for the game with payoffs defined throughθ 1 , . . . ,θ N ≥ 1 − δ, (11) where
; z is the optimal value of problem (9); andθ 1 , . . . ,θ N are the optimal solutions to (9) .
Roughly speaking, the z-approximate equilibrium describes the situation where each supplier does not necessarily play her best action given what others are doing, playing instead a strategy that is no worse than z relative to the best response. For the definition of z-approximate equilibrium, we refer the interested reader to [22, Sec. 2.2].
There are two probability measures in the statement of Theorem 1. One is related to the new dataα, while the other is related to the samples α 1 , . . . , α M . The probability in (11) is taken w.r.t. the new dataα. For a fixed set of samples, (11) holds with probability at least 1 − η w.r.t. the measure of samples. Theorem 1 essentially states that given typical samples, the probability that the estimated cost functions explain well a new future equilibrium is bounded below. It guarantees the accuracy of the estimated cost parameters under mild conditions.
V. ALGORITHMIC IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the algorithmic implementation for estimating the rivals' profit functions (or cost parameters θ i ), which can then be used to obtain equilibrium bids. We use historical data from which we can derive the past bids. Suppose we are aware of the market clearing price and the dispatch schedules of all suppliers. 3 Using this information, the past bids α j = (α j i ; i ∈ I j ), j = 1, . . . , M, can be computed via the market-clearing condition in (1), where β is constant and known. As before, we assume that for each supplier i there are sufficient observations j at which supplier i was marginal (i ∈ I j ).
It is worth mentioning that (9) might give multiple optimal solutions. Our goal is to recover the true cost parameters from this set. Although there might be multiple cost function estimates that can explain the observed equilibria well, only true costs are expected to have good out-of-sample performance. The following Algorithm is thus proposed to identify the true cost functions, based on which equilibrium bids could be computed via an iterative best response process. We refer to this algorithm as "random search," since it searches randomly in the set of optimal solutions until the one that performs well on a validation dataset is found. The out-of-sample performance is measured by the average discrepancy, d, between the computed and true bids on the validation dataset. The variable k serves as a counter of the iterations (random searches); the algorithm terminates when the discrepancy d is smaller than the tolerance level (τ ) or the maximum number of iterations is reached (MaxIter). In the latter case, we select the iteration with the best out-of-sample performance (smallest d).
In what follows, we present the main steps of the Algorithm 1.
The iterative best response process mentioned in Step 6 for computing equilibrium bids (which also applies to Step 9) is a standard fixed point iteration process. Each supplier solves problem (3) assuming all other suppliers are fixed in their previous bids (in fact, problem (3) in our case can be solved even analytically). Then the bids are updated and the process is repeated until an equilibrium is reached, i.e., no supplier can gain by unilaterally changing her bid. In practice, this process terminates in a few iterations since the profit functions are strictly concave.
We also note that the algorithm is amenable to parallelization, as essentially, given adequate resources, all iterations (Steps 3 to 8) could be run in parallel. Our next result establishes that the algorithm requires more than T iterations with a probability that diminishes exponentially with T. Equivalently, we can select a large enough maximum number of iterations, MaxIter, so that the algorithm will terminate before MaxIter is reached with a desirable large probability. The result further establishes that the convergence rate of the algorithm improves as we increase the size M t of the training set. The proof of the result is included in the Appendix. We numerically explore in Section VI the out-of-sample performance of the cost estimators obtained through this algorithm. Obtainθ i , i = 1, . . . , N, by solving problem (9) using the training dataset. Evaluate the discrepancy between computed and true bids on the validation dataset as
where α j val is the j-th true bid (obtained form the historical data) on the validation dataset, and · 1 is the 1 norm operator defined as the sum of the absolute elements of the argument. 8 : end while 9: Compute equilibrium bids usingθ i , i = 1, . . . , N for given Q and ξ . Assuming that all the past bids are at most¯ away from the equilibrium, and for a threshold τ = √¯ /(Nγ ), it follows: 1) for any T ≥ 1, the probability that the algorithm terminates after T iterations is no more than η T ; 2) for any 0 < < 1, when T ≥ (log )/(log η), the probability that the algorithm terminates after T iterations is no more than , where η is defined in the statement of Theorem 1. Moreover, as we increase the training sample size M t , the number of iterations that are needed for termination decreases when M t is large enough.
Another issue mentioned in the previous section is the implementation of the normalization constraint, i.e., the last constraint in (9) . For the purposes of this paper, unlike [22] , we do not use the true costs (since they are indeed unknown); instead, we set the rhs (estimate of the partial derivative) to zero for the median observation of the training dataset.
Finally, we note that the algorithm can handle cases in which "noise" is present in the data, e.g., in the past bids (observations). This is perhaps the most interesting -and not trivial, application which we also explore in Section VI.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we use synthetic input data to test the validity of our approach. We first describe the experimental setup.
We consider a setup with N = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 suppliers. For each case, we assume that the true cost parameters θ i1 and θ i2 , as well as c i2 of supplier i are equispaced in the intervals [7, 5] , [0.7, 0.9], and [0.05, 0.07], respectively. 4 We generate M = 200 past observations, in which demand Q and fuel price ξ are randomly selected within the intervals [50, 100], and [10, 30] , respectively. For each demand and fuel price realization, i.e., for each observation j (among the 200), using the true cost estimators, we generate equilibrium bids α j , assuming that all suppliers are marginal at all observations. The upper boundᾱ is set to 200. 5 The training and validation datasets are assumed to be of equal size, M t = M v = 100, using p = 0.5. For evaluating the out-of-sample performance we generate a test dataset with 100 additional demand and fuel price values, randomly selected within the aforementioned intervals.
The algorithm was implemented using MATLAB R2017a and Gurobi 7.5.1 (for solving the LP problem (9)), without any parallelization, and the computational experiments were run on an Intel i7 5500U, at 2.4GHz, with 8 GB RAM.
In what follows, we consider two setups: a "clean" setup without noise in the data (Section VI-A), and a setup with noise (Section VI-B). We evaluate the out-of-sample performance for the noisy data case (in Section VI-C), and we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters (in Section VI-D). Lastly, we present an interesting comparison of our approach with a method introduced in [15] (Section VI-E).
A. "Clean" Setup
As a measure of error for the cost estimators of θ i , we use the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), defined as
Notably, we expect to see that cost parameters with low discrepancy values would exhibit low MAPE values. In all cases, the algorithm managed to exactly reveal the true costs within 1 or 2 iterations for N = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 86 iterations for N = 10. We plot the results for N = 10, in Fig. 1 . Each circle corresponds to the discrepancy and MAPE values on the validation dataset for a certain partition of the samples into training/validation datasets.
In Fig. 1 we see that in general, the lower the discrepancy (the better the performance in the validation set), the lower the MAPE of the cost estimators (the better the estimates of the true costs).
B. Setup With Noise
We introduce noise in past bid observations, by generating them within 1% of the optimal value obtained by the iterative best response process. Alternatively, one may think of this noise as an error in estimating past bids from the market results. For instance, noisy data may be due to errors in estimates of the market outcome when not all data required (e.g., the exact schedules) are available, or due to errors in the slopes of the marginal cost function (reflected in parameter β i ). Further, noise may account for inaccurate estimates of inframarginal or extra-marginal suppliers that are removed from the observations. In a more loose interpretation of approximate equilibria, one may also think of this noise as observations in which suppliers do not play exactly their equilibrium bids.
For practical purposes, we set MaxIter = 10, 000 and a tight tolerance level τ = 10 −3 . In all cases the iteration limit is reached first; computational times ranged from 5 to 10 min. We note that by selecting such a tight tolerance level in absolute figures (with an average bid α of around 20, the algorithm would terminate when reaching discrepancies lower than 0.005%), and with 1% noise present in the data, it is almost certain that the algorithm will terminate by reaching the iteration limit. Hence, it is highly unlikely that such tight tolerance limits (which are achieved in the clean setup) will be also achievable in the case of noisy data. Nevertheless, we keep both termination conditions in the framework for the sake of completeness in case of noise-free data, to avoid unnecessary iterations. We also note that, by setting a relatively high iteration limit, we enhance the confidence in our results (see also Theorem 2); we elaborate further on the selection of this limit in Section VI-D.
For all cases (N = 2, . . . , 5, 10), the best achieved discrepancy at the validation dataset ranges from 0.111 to 0.154 in absolute figures-an average bid α of around 20 implies that the discrepancy is less than 1%. The results indicate reasonably good cost estimators with MAPE ranging from 0.86% to 3.44% (for the aforementioned best achieved discrepancies). In Fig. 2 , we show the performance in the validation dataset for N = 10 suppliers-compare with Fig. 1 for the "clean" setup. Fig. 2 also verifies the expected behavior when noise is present in the data, i.e., good performance in the validation dataset is associated with good cost estimators.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the true costs θ i1 and θ i2 and their estimates for N = 5 and N = 10 suppliers. We illustrate the best estimate (the one that corresponds to the lowest discrepancy calculated at the validation dataset), as well as the average cost estimators and their standard deviation (σ ) over the 10,000 iterations. The results indicate that the best estimates range from −3.9% (−2.3%) to 2% (2.2%) for θ i1 , and from −1% (−0.4%) to 2% (1.3%) for θ i2 for the case of N = 5 (N = 10) suppliers. The best estimates, which the Algorithm is designed to obtain, are reasonably close to the true cost parameters, and hence, they are expected to exhibit good out-of-sample performance. In fact, even the average estimates over the 10,000 iterations are not too far from the true cost parameters.
Next, we evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the best cost estimators using the test dataset (100 observations, different from the 200 observations that were used for the training and validation datasets). 
TABLE II DISCREPANCY OF EQUILIBRIUM BIDS (ESTIMATES VS TRUE COSTS)
C. Out-of-Sample Performance
For each observation (i.e., value of Q and ξ ) of the test dataset, we compare the equilibrium bids using the estimates ofθ i with bids derived using the true costs θ i , and we calculate the discrepancy (d)-using (12) with M v = 1. We summarize the results (average discrepancy-in absolute figures, and its standard deviation) in Table I . In Fig. 4 , we illustrate the values of the discrepancy for each observation of the test dataset for the case of N = 5 suppliers.
The results in Table I and Fig. 4 indicate a satisfactory out-of-sample performance. In fact, the average discrepancy is lower than the best achieved over the validation set. The reason is that the validation dataset contains noise, whereas the test dataset is a "clean," free of noise setup.
We then take a closer look at the equilibrium bids and profits. We consider 3 instances of demand and fuel price: (a) Q = 45, ξ = 8, (b) Q = 75, ξ = 20, and (c) Q = 110, ξ = 35. Note that instance (b) refers to the mean demand and mean fuel price of the past bids, whereas instances (a) and (c) contain values that are outside the intervals used for generating the past bids, i.e., that fall outside the range of previously observed values. For each instance, we list the discrepancy values (in absolute figures) in Table II .
We show the equilibrium bids (α i ) for the three instances, and for N = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 suppliers, in Fig. 5 . 
TABLE III TOTAL PROFITS USING ESTIMATES (VS TRUE COSTS)
From Fig. 5 we see that the difference between the equilibrium bids using the estimates compared to the ones using the true costs is very small. For example, for the case N = 5 suppliers, the difference ranges from −0.135 to 0.047 for instance (a), from −0.074 to 0.133 for instance (b), and from −0.076 to 0.351 for instance (c). The differences reported as percentages range from −1.1% to 0.4%, from −0.3% to 0.6%, and from −0.2% to 1%, for instances (a), (b), and (c), respectively.
Lastly, we provide in Table III the total profits for the three instances, calculated using (6); the profits using the estimated costs are shown first and the profits using the true costs follow in parenthesis for comparison. Apart from the expected behavior of total profits decreasing when the number of supplier increases, and total profits increasing with increasing demand, the results also show that the differences using the estimated costs are very small (in fact the relative differences are within 5%).
D. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the level of noise, the number of available observations, and the number of iterations. As a base case, we consider the case for N = 5 suppliers. 1) Noise Level: As already mentioned, introducing noise in the past bids can be thought of as introducing errors in obtaining the past bids from the available or estimated market data. In the previous sections, we assumed a noise level of 1%; in this section, we explore higher noise levels (2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, and 10%), and we present the results for the performance on the validation dataset (discrepancy vs. MAPE) in Fig. 6 . The best discrepancy achieved ranges from 0.116 (noise level 1%) to 1.204 (noise level 10%). MAPE values range from 1.75% to 10.46%. The results verify the expected behavior, i.e., discrepancy and MAPE increase with the noise level. They also verify that good performance in the validation dataset (low discrepancies) is associated with good estimators (low MAPE), under all noise levels. Table IV presents the out-of-sample performance under various noise levels. The results are in good agreement with the ones presented in Table I . They also indicate low average discrepancies, which increase with the noise level. Note that at high noise levels (see 10%) the standard deviation becomes low, indicating that the discrepancy is mostly affected by the noise.
2) Past Observations: In the previous sections, we considered a dataset with M = 200 available past observations. In this section, we explore the market outcome for various numbers of past observations (20, 50, 100, 200 , 500, and 1000), for N = 5 suppliers, and noise level 1%. Fig. 7 illustrates the out-of-sample performance of the best cost estimators.
Not surprisingly, and as predicted by Theorem 1, Fig. 7 shows that the out-of-sample performance improves with the number of available past observations. From Theorem 1 we deduce that as the number of past observations M increases, the probability that our estimatesθ 1 , . . . ,θ N yield an equilibrium that is close to the true one increases. This is due to the fact that, as shown in the Appendix (see Eqs. (14) and (15)), η decreases with the number of past observations. As a result, increasing the training sample size could lead to a small discrepancy between computed and true bids, and thus an improved out-of-sample performance, which is consistent with Fig. 7 . Interestingly, even with 20 available observations, the performance discrepancy is reasonable. We also checked the average discrepancies (out-of-sample performance) for the various noise levels with only 20 observations and the results are also good; average discrepancies range from 0.107 to 0.852 (increasing with the level of noise) with standard deviations that range from 0.0241 to 0.0644.
3) Number of Iterations: Last but not least, we elaborate on the selection of the maximum number of iterations, i.e., the termination condition. Theorem 2 yielded a rigorous result that provides guidance on how to select the iteration limit. Here, we numerically verify that a small number of iterations is sufficient to provide some good enough estimators.
In Fig. 8, we show the values of the discrepancy calculated in the validation dataset at each iteration k, for the case of N = 5 suppliers with noise level 1%. For ease of exposition, we plotted the first 100 iterations of the algorithm (out of the 10,000). The results indicate that good enough estimators (with low discrepancy) can be obtained early in the process. In fact, in the first 100 iterations, we observed 7 instances with discrepancies that are less than 10% higher than the best achieved (which in our tests was 0.116). We elaborate on this indication in the following figure. Fig. 9 shows the maximum average discrepancy (±σ ) computed over the top x% of the iterations ranked in ascending order of discrepancy computed over the same test dataset. For instance, for the top 1%, i.e., the top 100 iterations out of 10,000, the worst achieved out-of-sample performance was an average d = 0.100 with σ = 0.0167.
Lastly, we investigate the relationship between discrepancy values and the total profits. In Fig. 10 , we show the values of the discrepancy and the total profits calculated in the validation dataset at each iteration, for the case of N = 5 suppliers, M = 200 past observations with noise level 1%, and MaxIter = 10, 000 iterations. It can be seen that the larger the discrepancy is, the smaller the total profits, which validates the use of the discrepancy as a performance metric in identifying the best cost estimators. [15] In this section, we compare the performance of our approach with the method introduced in [15] , which assumes that the bidding coefficients of any rival supplier follow a bivariate normal distribution whose mean and covariance could be inferred from the past observed bids. The profit maximization problem for a single supplier i is then reformulated to involve only α i and β i , with the market clearing price R and the production level P i evaluated at the mean bids of the rival suppliers.
E. Comparison With the Method in
We note that [15] does not estimate rivals' cost functions; it calculates the bids using as input the mean and covariance of rivals' bidding coefficients. In our setup, since we assume that the bidding slope β is known, only the mean and variance of α need to be inferred from the historical data. For the needs of our comparisons, we use the noisy setup with 1% noise level. We evaluate the performance of [15] on the test dataset (that contains 100 equilibrium bids). The average discrepancy between the solution obtained using [15] and the equilibrium bids on the test dataset is shown in Table V (the differences with the values presented in Table I that are obtained using our approach are shown in parentheses). The results show that [15] leads to significantly higher discrepancies (as well as higher standard deviations), indicating that our approach obtains a more accurate prediction of the bids.
We then take a closer look at the bids and profits by considering the 3 instances illustrated in Section VI-C. In Table VI we list the discrepancy of bids obtained using [15] (in parentheses we show the differences with the values listed in Table II ). The results show that for instance (b), which represents instances that have been constantly observed in the past, [15] achieves a comparable performance with our approach, and occasionally even lower discrepancies. However, the performance of [15] is much worse for instances (a) and (c), which contain values that were outside the range of past observations. The reason is that [15] implicitly assumes that rivals' bidding behavior is similar to what has been observed in the past, which results in a large bias when a new, unseen scenario occurs. By contrast, through estimating rivals' cost functions from the past bids, our approach acquires more information, and exhibits a stronger out-of-sample inference capability that guarantees a low estimation bias for every possible scenario. Interestingly but not surprisingly, [15] achieves better results when the number of suppliers is large, in which case the bids are very close (due to competition), see Fig. 5 .
In Table VII we list the total profits for the bids derived using [15] , and we show in parentheses the differences with the values in Table III obtained using the cost estimates. Recall that the profits obtained using the cost estimates are very close to the profits obtained using the true costs (within +/−5%). For instance (b), the two methods obtain similar profits. For instance (c) which represents higher demands and fuel prices, our approach achieves much higher profits. The opposite is true for instance (a), which represents lower demands and fuel prices. This is an interesting result, which is explained by the fact that the bids generated using [15] are biased by the mean past bids. Hence, they tend to be values of past observations, i.e., they are inflated for the instances of lower demands and fuel prices, and they are reduced for higher demands and fuel prices. More specifically, the values of the equilibrium bids are about 25% higher in instance (a), and about 12% lower in instance (c) compared to the ones shown in Fig. 5 . Of course, in instance (a) where the bids (and hence, profits) are inflated, the conditions are ripe for a new supplier to come in, underbid, and capture significant market share.
In conclusion, our approach possesses a stronger out-ofsample inference capability attributed to the estimation of the cost functions. The method proposed in [15] ignores the interaction among suppliers, assumes a normal distribution and uses only the mean values of the past bids to infer rivals' behavior, which accounts for its unsatisfactory performance in new, unseen scenarios.
VII. EXTENSION TO LOCATION-DEPENDENT PRICES
So far, we assumed competition among suppliers in uncongested networks. Indeed, several day-ahead electricity markets clear ignoring network congestion. In the instance of such dayahead market rules, the system operator adjusts the generation dispatch to observe line flow capacity constraints and ensure secure and reliable operation.
In U.S. markets, however, the transmission system representation has been part of the standard market design for many years, with resulting "Locational Marginal Prices" (LMPs) representing the marginal cost at each node of the transmission system. In practice, without entering in a detailed analysis of how LMPs are formed, we note that "price islands" may characterize clearing prices, differing only slightly to reflect varying loss factors.
Our method appears to assume away the fact that network connected markets result in location dependent clearing price differentials driven by (i) small effects of location-specific line loss contributions, but also, (ii) significant contributions during network congestion events. It can capture and address, however, significant congestion-caused differentials by detecting market-splitting occurrences that result in "price islands" with essentially homogeneous prices within each island. Although this limits the number of relevant observations when price islanding occurs, it utilizes the unusually high or low price events associated with congestion.
Our approach applies to price islands where congestion is a result of generators outside of the relevant island, which do not set the price and, hence, are not part of our analysis. In this context, the market clearing price in each island s is R s = α i + β i P i , i ∈ I s , where I s is the set of marginal suppliers in island s. The residual demand in each island is Q s = i∈I s P i . Similarly to (2) In the forward problem, the profit of the suppliers in each island is therefore straightforwardly defined. Considering the inverse problem, we note that the past bids may contain both congested and uncongested instances. The set of marginal suppliers may be different in each instance, and furthermore the islands in the congested instances may be different. But in either case, our approach can handle these different sets, since for each observation j, we can have different price islands s ∈ S j , where S j is the set of price islands for the j-th observation, and for each price island of that observation we have a set of marginal suppliers denoted by I j s . Hence, the inverse optimization problem in (9) is applied for each price island s for observations j within this island, and for the respective set of marginal suppliers for the specific island. Essentially, the uncongested case represents one single island (and can still be described by the above notation).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper, we proposed an inverse optimization method to estimate electricity suppliers' cost functions in the dayahead electricity market based on historical bidding data. The problem of computing optimal bidding strategies can be seen as an equilibrium computation problem given the estimated payoff functions. We applied a "random search" algorithm to estimate the cost function parameters of electricity generators; specifically, the parameters that are proportional to their generation output. The algorithm essentially seeks cost function parameters (among multiple possible values compatible with the past data) which have good out-of-sample generalization performance. We established strong, exponential-type probabilistic convergence guarantees for this algorithm. Extensive numerical experimentation verifies that one can recover accurate estimates of the cost function parameters, which, in turn, allows generators to bid with knowledge of how competitors would respond. Even though we considered a simple setting involving no congestion or transmission network effects, we discussed an extension of the methodology to locationdependent prices.
Regarding future research directions, it would be of interest to develop non-parametric approaches that do not require to assume a specific parametric form for the cost functions. Finally, in addition to estimating competing generators' cost functions, our methodology is particularly useful in estimating the underlying cost functions of market participants who bid synthetic or virtual generators corresponding to con
